La Mauvaise Qualite de la Loi: Vagueness Doctrine at the French Constitutional Council by Rrapi, Patricia
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 37
Number 2 Winter 2010 Article 2
1-1-2010
La Mauvaise Qualite de la Loi: Vagueness Doctrine
at the French Constitutional Council
Patricia Rrapi
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patricia Rrapi, La Mauvaise Qualite de la Loi: Vagueness Doctrine at the French Constitutional Council, 37 Hastings Const. L.Q. 243
(2010).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol37/iss2/2
La Mauvaise Qualite de la Loi:
Vagueness Doctrine at the French
Constitutional Council
by PATRICIA RRAPI*
Introduction
Statutes, the United States Supreme Court asserts, should mean
what they say. Yet, in reality, no one would be surprised to learn that
statutes do not often say what they mean. Not only are vague laws
widely found, but statutory vagueness comes in many different forms.1
In France, vagueness of statutes has drawn judges' and scholars'
attention over the last ten years. The doctrinal literature on this issue
is abundant. Sounding the alarm, this literature invites judges and
politicians to find remedies for what is generally named as the
"disease" of our democracy.2 In response, the French Constitutional
Council, since 1998, has been trying to generate a "quality of law"
doctrine in its cases in order to improve citizens' accessibility to the
law. The doctrine, however, remains under-developed compared to
its counterpart in the United States.
Vagueness-of-law concerns seem to be well known in the United
States, at least since the Supreme Court invoked the vagueness
* Fellow, Institut Louis-Favoreu, Universit6 Paul Cezanne, Aix-Marseille 111,
France; Visiting Scholar, Loyola Law School. I am indebted to Professor Karl Manheim
for reading the article, helping with the U.S. constitutional law, and for discussing and
analyzing the framework. I am also indebted to Professor Aaron Caplan for helpful
explanations of the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment cases.
1. Keith Culver, Varieties of Vagueness, 54 U. TORONTO L. J. 109 (2004). See also
TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTr, VAGUENESS IN LAW (Oxford Univ. Press) (2001).
2. BERTRAND MATHIEU, LA LO (2nd ed. 2006). See also Pierre de Montalivet, La
"Juridicisation" de la Ldgistique. A Propos de l'Objectif de Valeur Constitutionnelle
d'Accessibilit6 et d'Intelligibilitd de la Loi, in LA CONFEcTION DE LA LoI, 99 (Presses
Universitaries de France.) (2005); Patrick Wachsmann, Sur la Qualitg de la Loi, reprinted
in MELANGES: PAUL AMSELEK, 809 (Emile Bruylant ed., 2005).
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doctrine for the first time in 1875.' The case law here is abundant and
covers a wide variety of situations. Therefore, a comparative study of
these two doctrines, French and American, may lead to new
understandings of the subject, at least for French jurists. As it will be
discussed, the French Constitutional Council has to learn a lot from
the American vagueness doctrine. On the other hand, U.S.
constitutional law will become familiar with new concepts, such as
intelligibility or accessibility of statutes. The U.S. Supreme Court
develops these notions in a different way. The purpose of this article
is to emphasize the necessary communication between these two
doctrines.
Vagueness is not an issue unique to the law; it also has political
and philosophical dimensions. Without approaching these theoretical
aspects of vagueness, this comparative study of French and American
doctrines aspires simply to provide an overview of French and
American case law. Yet, comparative analyses are problematic. It is
not only that the French quality of law doctrine has yet to mature to
that of its American counterpart, but dissimilarities in respective
systems of judicial review complicate in-depth comparisons. Even if
the purpose of these two doctrines were the same-providing
constitutional rules on vagueness-American and French cases in
which statutes are challenged for vagueness are materially different.
Therefore, not only does the reasoning behind these two doctrines
differ, but remedies provided by American and French judges to
vague laws must also be considered within the confines of their
respective legal systems.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that "federal courts have the
power to adopt narrowing constructions of federal legislation.
Indeed, the federal courts have the duty to avoid constitutional
difficulties by doing so if such construction is fairly possible."'
Andrew Goldsmith calls this remedy "judicial interpretation
narrow[ing the] statute."5  After judicial narrowing, the offending
provision is no longer unconstitutionally vague. In France, the
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council is invoked before a statute
is signed into law, by the President of the Republic, and subsequently
enforced. The Council is, in effect, a "council of revision," as the
concept was described, and rejected, at the American constitutional
3. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void for
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279,280 n.1 (2003).
4. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330-31 (1988) (citation omitted).
5. Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 295.
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convention in 1787.6 Accordingly, the Council cannot know how
courts will interpret the law in application, even if in some cases the
Council provides its own interpretation (reserves d'interpr~tation).
Therefore, the first part of this article provides a summary of the
main distinctions between French and American judicial review. In
the second part, I analyze French case law in order to bring out a
comparison to the American vagueness doctrine, which is described
in the third part. The last part concerns the rise of a French "quality
of law" doctrine through the new procedure of "preliminary
question." This procedure will give the Constitutional Council
jurisdiction to review constitutional matters in actual cases.7 It is this
new feature of judicial review in France that makes comparison to
American constitutional law so vital. Although the United States has
known concrete judicial review since Marbury v. Madison,8 this
element of democratic institutions is new to France.9 We have a lot to
learn from our American cousins.
I. Judicial Review in France and the United States
A. The Constitutional Council
1. Creation, Composition, and Functions in the French Constitutional
System
The Constitutional Council was created in 1958 and became the
first institution under the French system vested with the power of
judicial review. From 1790 to 1958, the French constitutional system
not only ignored and prohibited judicial review but also criticized the
6. Resolution 8 of the original Virginia Plan contained the proposal for the national
Council of Revision. It was officially submitted to the Convention on May 29, 1787. 1
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1911) (It was proposed "that the Executive and a convenient number of the
National Judiciary, ought to compose a council of revision with authority to examine every
act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular
Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said
Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the act of the National Legislature be again
passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by [ ] of the members of each
branch."); see James T. Barry, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 248 (1989). Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court refers to the
Framers' intent to limit courts' power by rejecting the Council of Revision. See United
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1999).
7. See Andrd Roux, Le Nouveau Conseil constitutionnel? Vers la fin de I'exception
franqaise, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE [JCP] 2008, I, no. 175 (Fr.).
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. Louis FAVOREU & LOC PHILIP, LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (7th ed. 2005).
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rule that the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Marbury.1° The
specter of "the government of judges,"'" as observed by French
scholars in the American system, was thought to be against the
principle of the separation of powers. Allowing judges to review the
law-an expression of general will 13-was perceived as a violation of
legislative sovereignty. 4
Only after World War II did France, along with other European
countries, conceive a special constitutional body detached from the
regular and administrative judiciary."i Embracing uniquely European
forms of review, the French system of judicial review is a compromise
between a long tradition of hostility and rejection of any form of
judicial review and the necessity of some mechanism to protect the
supremacy of the constitution. Therefore, the Constitutional Council,
as inspired by Hans Kelsen,"6 is the prototype of the European
"model" of "constitutional review. ,17
The Constitutional Council is a constitutional body composed of
nine members appointed by the President of the Republic and the
10. See Michel Troper, S~paration des Pouvoirs, in DICTIONNAIRE DE PHILOSOPHIE
POLITIQUE 708 (Phillippe Raynaud & Stephanie Rials eds., Presses Universitaires de
France 2003). See also Michel Troper, La Notion de Pouvoir Judiciaire au D~but de la
Revolution Franqaise, in 1791 LA PREMIIRE CONSTITUTION FRANQAISE, at 355 (1993).
11. EDOUARD LAMBERT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES ET LA LUTrE CONTRE
LA LIGISLATION SOCIALE AUX ETATS-UNIS (Marcel Girard ed., 1921).
12. Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review And Why it
May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744 (2002).
13. The term "general will" is inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans.,
St. Martin's Press 1978) (1762). His theory of the "general will" has been, since the
French Revolution, at the core of French constitutional theory. Therefore, Article 6 of the
Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789 states, "The Law is the
expression of the general will." Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August
1789, art. 6 (1789) (Fr.).
14. The French Revolution produced a separation of powers doctrine that rigidly
confined judicial authority. From the perspective of French separation of powers
orthodoxy, the judicial branch was not only a negligent one but the judicial review was
also thought to lead to a confusion of powers. See also Michel Troper, LA SEPARATION
DES POUVOIRS ET L'HISTOIRE CONSTITUTIONNELLE FRANQAISE (1973).
15. FAVOREU & PHILIP, supra note 9.
16. The modern European constitutional court is the invention of Hans Kelsen. In
his article, La Garantie Juridictionnelle de la Constitution, 45 REVUE Du DROIT PUBLIC
[R.D.D.P.] 197 (1928) (Fr.)., he proposed a particular judicial review, different from the
American one. In order to avoid arguments against the judicial review, he imagined a
special constitutional body. For further explanations, see ALEC STONE SWEET,
GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000).
17. See LOUIS FAVOREU, LES COURS CONSTITUTIONNELLES (3d ed., Presses
Universitaires de France 2000) (1996).
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Presidents of each House of Parliament.' 8 Under Article 61 of the
Constitution of 1958, the Constitutional Council exercises a priori,
abstract review exclusively and solely upon referral by political
authorities. 9 The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the
President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, sixty
Members of the National Assembly or sixty Senators may refer Acts
of Parliament to the Constitutional Council before their
promulgation. ° Until recently, there has been no other avenue for
review by the Council.2
Under Article 62 of the Constitution, "a provision declared
unconstitutional on the basis of Article 61 shall be neither
promulgated nor implemented."22  Article 61 states further: "no
appeal shall lie from the decisions of the Constitutional Council.23
They shall be binding on public authorities and on all administrative
authorities and all courts., 24  This article provides Constitutional
Council rulings with the authority inherent to judicial decisions.25
Concrete review is forbidden; once promulgated, laws are immune
from scrutiny by the Council or by any other jurisdiction. Thus, the
Constitutional Council does not hear "cases and controversies,"
which is the full extent of U.S. federal jurisdiction. 6
2. Comparison of Judicial Review in France and the United States
Abstract review differs from judicial review principally in that it
is neither dependent on nor incidental to concrete litigation or
18. 1958 Const. art. 56 (Fr.).
19. 1958 Const. art. 61 (Fr.) ("Acts of Parliament may be referred to the
Constitutional Council, before they promulgation, by the President of the Republic, the
Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, the President of Senate, sixty
Members of the National Assembly or sixty Senators.").
20. In 1974, the French Constitution was amended and the new ruling vested standing
in sixty members of the political minority in either the Senate or the National Assembly to
challenge the constitutionality of an act. On the contrary the U.S. Supreme Court has
always refused standing to political minorities. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
21. The new procedure of "question pr~judicielle" is discussed later in this article.
22. 1958 CONST. art. 62 (Fr.).
23. 1958 CONST. art. 61 (Fr.).
24. Id.
25. Louis Favoreu, La Decision de Constitutionnalit6, 38 Revue Internationale de
Droit Compar6 [R.I.D.C.] 611, 611-633 (1986). See also Jacques Robert, Louis Favoreu,
Francisco Rubio Llorente & Alessandro Pizzorusso, L'Autorit6 de Chose Jug6e des
Decisions des Juridictions Constitutionnelles, 265-282 (1995).
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
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controversy involving a statute.27 The abstract review process results
"in a ruling on the prima facie constitutionality of a legislative text; a
concrete 'case or controversy' is not a requisite condition."'  Alec
Stone observed that the abstract review is a purely exegetical exercise
since it takes place outside of the tenets of the judicial paradigm.29
The judicial paradigm refers to Martin Shapiro's analysis of
courts on the "social logic" of triadic conflict involving two persons in
conflict and a third person called to assist in achieving a solution."
Therefore, he emphasized that in terms of judicial paradigm, the
Council's role in the French political system is much more legislative
than judicial.31
The "judicial paradigm," even in a concrete judicial review, does
not permit a sufficient analysis of constitutional law challenges since
these issues miss narrowly political questions.32 Indeed, when judges
are invited to challenge the constitutionality of a statute they often
participate in the law-making process itself and affront directly the
legislative power. Therefore, they do not often behave as a "neutral
third party."33 But abstract constitutional review seems to be even
further removed from triadic resolution than is judicial review."
Therefore, Constitutional Council cases and their rulings seem only to
complete the law-making process. These cases, and the example of
quality of law doctrine, do not always guide us by concrete and
precise judicial reasoning. This does not mean that the Constitutional
Council fails to give judicial answers to constitutional law challenges. 5
27. Louis Favoreu, Modele Am~ricain et Modele Europ~en de Justice Constitutionnelle
[The American Model and the European Model of Constitutional Justice], 4 ANNUAIRE
INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE [A.I.J.C.] 57 (1988) (Fr.).
28. ALEC STONE SWEET, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
29. Id.
30. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1-2
(Univ. of Chi. Press 1981).
31. STONE, supra note 28.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Alec Stone, The Birth and the Development of Abstract Review in Western
Europe: Constitutional Courts and Policy-Making in Western Europe, 19 POL'Y STUD. J.
81,81-95 (1990).
35. Louis Favoreu's writings proved that the Constitutional Council's activities are
judicial and not political. See LOUIS FAVOREU, LA POLITIQUE SAISIE PAR LE DROIT
(1988); see also LOUIS FAVOREU, ET AL., DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL (2008); LOUIS
FAVOREU & LOIC PHILIP, GRANDES DtCISIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (7th
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It does mean, however, that the French Constitutional Council and
U.S. Supreme Court play different roles in their respective countries.
This article explores how these courts pursue similar purposes
through different jurisprudential means. As a result, this comparative
study of French and American vagueness doctrine seeks only to give
two different approaches to the same issue, even if the purpose of the
doctrines is the same in both cases.
Indeed, its role in abstract judicial review does not permit the
Constitutional Council to provide a concrete meaning of its quality of
law doctrine, whereas the Supreme Court is able in a concrete case to
ameliorate the vagueness of a statute as it is applied to citizens.36 This
is true even in "facial" challenges before American courts, where the
precise facts of a given controversy often do not factor into the
analysis.37 Facial challenges still must meet "case and controversy"
requirements and the case must be ripe for adjudication. That is far
different from the European "abstract review of legislation" which
refers to "the review of a statute's constitutionality prior to its
application or enforcement. 3 8 There are real and adverse litigants in
facial cases, unlike the a priori review of the Constitutional Council.
Facts in the former may not be dispositive, but can still illuminate the
controversy. Facts in the latter are hypothetical at best.
Thus, while there are similarities between French and American
constitutional review in facial cases, the difference between abstract
review and real controversies remains important in understanding the
different development of French and American vagueness doctrines.
Yet, as judicial review in France moves ever more closely to its
American counterpart, this comparative study may be helpful in some
manner as the Constitutional Council further develops its vagueness
doctrine.
3. Quality of Law Under the French Constitution
For the Constitutional Council, a statute is vague when it is not
"intelligible" or not "accessible. "3 9 These two principles are two
ed. 2005); Burt Neuborne, In Honor of late Louis Favoreu: France Exceptionalism in
Constitutional Law, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 17 (2007).
36. Still, the Supreme Court accepts facial challenges in vagueness cases. Differences
between "facial" challenges and "abstract review" will be discussed later in this article.
37. See also infra note 105.
38. See Stone, supra note 12, at 2772.
39. Still "vagueness" seems to be different from "intelligibility" and "accessibility."
Vagueness is a lack of distinctness or preciseness. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3538
(compact ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1976). The French word "vague" has the same meaning
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complimentary components of the quality of law doctrine.
Constitutional grounds for this scrutiny are the individual rights
provisions of Articles 4, 5, 6, and 16 of the Declaration of Human and
Civic Rights, adopted during the French Revolution in 1789.'
Because of these several grounds, the quality of law test does not
give a very precise definition of the principle of intelligibility and
accessibility of law. Cases in which the Constitutional Council has
been asked to review the constitutionality of the law because of its
vagueness are rare. Moreover, these cases do not take a significant
role in individual rights' protection as do the U.S. Supreme Court
cases. Therefore the quality of law doctrine, in its current form, looks
feeble compared to the vagueness doctrine under U.S. constitutional
law.
Cases in which the Constitutional Council has invalidated a law
because of its vagueness are also rare. Yet, there are some cases in
which the constitutional judge, without challenging the
constitutionality of the referred statute, more fully explicates the
quality of law doctrine.
(que l'esprit a du mal A saisir a cause de son caract~re mouvant et de son sens mal d~fini,
mal 6tabli. LE PETIT ROBERT, DiCrIONNAIRES LE ROBERT 2634 (2000). "Intelligible,"
both in English and in French means "capable of being understood" or "comprehensible"
and "accessibility" stands for the quality of "being accessible or of admitting approach."
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1456 (compact ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1976)); LE PETIT
ROBERT, DICTIONNAIRES LE ROBERT 1336 (2000). Vagueness concerns borderline cases
that a statute may or not include, whereas "intelligibility" and "accessibility" refer to the
meaning of the statute itself. In that sense, the Constitutional Council has not exactly
dealt with vague constitutional challenges. Moreover, in an abstract review it cannot
really foresee "borderline cases." But for the purposes of the comparison and since both
the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Court provide similar prongs for their
respective doctrines, these two constitutional requirements will be considered as
analogous.
40. Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789, art. 4 (1789) (Fr.)
("Liberty consists in being able to do anything that does not harm others: thus, the
exercise of the natural rights of every man has no bounds other than those that ensure to
other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights. Only Law may determine
these bounds."); id. at art. 5 ("The Law has the right to forbid only those actions that are
injurious to society. Nothing that is not forbidden by Law may be hindered; and no one
may be compelled to do what the Law does not ordain."); id. at art. 6 ("The law is the
expression of the general will. All citizens have the right to take part, personally or
through their representatives, in its making. It must be the same for all, whether it protects
or punishes. All citizens, being equal in its eyes, shall de equally eligible to all High offices,
public positions and employments, according to their ability, and without other distinction
than that of their virtues and talents."); id. at art. 16 ("Any society in which no provision is
made for guaranteeing rights or for the separation of powers, has no Constitution.").
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4. The Principle of Intelligibility and Accessibility of Law
The quality of law doctrine is a recent theoretical construct. The
Constitutional Council distinguishes two facets that the quality of law
requires: intelligibility and accessibility of law.
First, the constitutional requirement for accessibility of law
seems to provide the citizen with material access to the law in respect
to the principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense.4
Therefore, the principle of accessibility means that the law should be
published in a sufficient way (official journal) and that its
presentation should be clear. The other facet concerns the content of
the law. Indeed, the principle of intelligibility seems to refer more to
the clarity of law and to the ability for the citizens to reach the
meaning of the law. Initially, the Constitutional Council tried to
distinguish the principle of clarity of law from the principle of
intelligibility and accessibility of law. The Constitutional Council for
the first time in 1998 invoked the principle of clarity of law.42 In 1999
it invoked the comparable principle of intelligibility and accessibility
of law.43
After being criticized for having separated the clarity of law from
the intelligibility of law, the Constitutional Council abandoned the
principle of clarity." The principle of clarity was thought to provide
an objective standard of "common understanding" whereas the
principle of intelligibility and accessibility furnished a subjective
appreciation of the same standard.
The ground for the principle of clarity of law was different from
the ground for intelligibility and accessibility of law. Indeed, between
1999 and 2004 the Constitutional Council held that the principle of
clarity of law was derived from Article 34 of the Constitution of 1958,
which enumerates Parliament's powers rather than the rights
provisions in the 1789 Declaration.45
These two principles did not bind the legislature in the same way.
Whereas the principle of intelligibility and accessibility of law is only
"un objectif A valeur constitutionnelle" (constitutional status), which
means that this principle is only a constitutional goal that the
41. Laure Milano, ContrOle de Constitutionnalite et Qualitg de la Loi, 3 REVUE DU
DROIT PUBLIC [R.D.D.P.] 637 (2006); see also de Montalivet, supra note 2.
42. CC decision no. 98-401DC, June 10, 1998, Rec. 258.
43. CC decision no. 99-421DC, Dec. 16, 1999, Rec. 136.
44. Milano, supra note 41, at 645.
45. CC decision no. 98-401DC, supra note 42. See also CC decision no. 2001-455DC,
Jan. 12, 2002, Rec. 49.
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legislator must try to achieve (obligation of means), the second
principle puts a stronger obligation on the legislature (obligation of
result).46  Many commentators found this distinction difficult to
explain.47
The French Constitutional Council, however, tried by using these
two different principles, and after 2004, by using only the principle of
accessibility and intelligibility of law to set a standard (probably an
objective one, as we will see later) which permits one to measure the
understandability of law. The Constitutional Council held that:
The equality before the law laid down by Article 6 of the
Declaration of Human and Civic rights of 1789 ("DHCR") and
the "guarantee of rights" required by Article 16 may not be
effective if the citizens do not have sufficient knowledge of the
statutes that apply to them, that such knowledge is also necessary
for the exercise of rights and freedoms as guaranteed by Article
4 of the Declaration (Natural rights have no bounds other than
those that ensure to the other members of society the
enjoyment of these same rights. Only Law may determine these
bounds) and by Article 5 of the same Declaration (nothing that
is not forbidden by Law may be hindered, and no one may be
compelled to do what the Law does not ordain).48
The Council usually repeats this paragraph (consid6rant de
principe) in cases involving intelligibility and accessibility challenges.
The object is to impose on the legislature a requirement that its laws
be readily available and comprehensible by citizens so as to protect
their rights.
B. Cases Raising the Quality of Law Doctrine
1. 1998: Future Implementation of Law
In the case Act Reducing Working Hours, Members of the
National Assembly and Senators challenged a controversial law that
reduced working hours.4 9 Even though the law passed in 1998, its
enforcement was deferred until 2000 and 2002. The parties making
the referral to the Constitutional Council argued that by deferring its
46. Milano, supra note 41, at 646.
47. Bertrand Mathieu & Michel Verpeaux, Chronique Constitutionnelle, 19 LES
PETITES AFFICHES 16 (2002) (Fr.).
48. CC decision no. 99-421DC, supra note 43.
49. CC decision no. 98-401DC, supra note 42.
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effective date until after a government report was issued, the law was
unconstitutionally vague.0 They further argued that Parliament
abdicated its power (incompetence negative) by deferring until a
future time.5 According to this argument, if Parliament refers a law
to a future report (and therefore uncertain content), the precise
implementation of law is unknown when the statute is passed. 2 The
Constitutional Council evaluated the argument, but held that the
challenged law was sufficiently clear for constitutional purposes."
Parliament could defer the implementation of a law without it failing
for lack of clarity. 4
This case concerned the clarity of law doctrine, which was
abandoned in later cases. The clarity of law doctrine is different from
the principles of intelligibility and accessibility of law, and it is linked
to the American "non-delegation" doctrine, which will be discussed
later in this article. Yet, it is important to mention this case since it is
the first case in which the Council expressed its concerns about the
quality of law.5
2. 1999: Codification of Law
In the case Act Authorizing the Government to Codify, by
Ordinance, the Legislative Volume of Several Codes,56 Parliament
delegated its power under Article 38 of the Constitution57 in order to
allow the Government to undertake the codification of the law.
Article 38, as interpreted by the Constitutional Council, requires that
the purpose of the delegation of legislative power should be precisely
defined and has to be justified by some urgency. 9 The parties making
the referral to the Constitutional Council argued that Article 38 of
the Constitution was violated since the legislature did not observe
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See 5 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 11 (1998).
55. Milano, supra note 41, at 640.
56. CC decision no. 99-421DC, supra note 43.
57. 1958 CONST. art. 38 ("In order to implement its program, the Government may
ask Parliament for authorization, for a limited period, to take measures by Ordinance that
are normally the preserve of statute law.").
58. Indeed, French statutes are grouped together in Codes. Each of these codes deals
with a particular subject: Criminal Code, General Tax Code, Civil Code, etc.
59. CC decision no. 76-72DC, January 12,1977, Rec. 343.
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these two requirements. 60 The Constitutional Council held that the
principle of intelligibility and accessibility of law which are
constitutionally required and which Parliament was trying to
accomplish through the challenged delegation, could justify the
urgency requirement under Article 38 of the Constitution.61
This case provides precision for the principle of accessibility of
law. The Council said that the codification of statutes could improve
citizens' access to the law.62 Since the codification improves access,
the principle of accessibility of law itself includes the requirement that
the statute be carefully presented.63
Among other quality of law problems that have been raised in
France over the past ten years, the overproduction of legislation is
indisputably the most alarming. 64 Yet, the Constitutional Council as a
judge cannot control the quantity of statutes, since it concerns
Parliament's activity as a political body. But, the Council uses the
principle of accessibility as an indirect tool in order to provide relief
from the huge quantity of statutes. Since Parliament cannot help but
pass a large quantity of statutes, it still has to present them carefully.
3. 2003: Election of Senators
Provision 7 of the Senators Election Act (Article L. 52-3 of
Election Code) reads in part:
For each category of election, the wording and the font size of
ballots must be in accordance with laws and regulations- for
elections "au scrutin majoritaire" (election by majority vote),
the ballots may not include any name other than the proper
name of the candidate- for elections "au scrutin de liste" (list-
system), the lists presented in each of the departmental or
regional constituency can take a single name in order to be
identified at the national level. This could be the name of a
65group or political party or their representatives.
60. CC decision no. 99-421DC, supra note 43.
61. See 8 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 20 (2000).
62. CC decision no. 99-421DC, supra note 43.
63. Milano, supra note 41, at 643; see also de Montalivet, supra note 2.
64. Svein Eng, Legislative Inflation and the Quality of Law, in LEGISPRUDENCE: A
NEW THEORETICAL APPROACH TO LEGISLATION 65, 65-79 (Luc Wintgens ed., 2003).
65. CC decision no. 2003-475DC, July 24, 2003, Rec. 397.
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The parties making the referral to the Constitutional Council
submitted that the changes to the Senators' elections were not
"directly related" to the provision of that bill.'
The Constitutional Council ruled that Parliament intended to
regulate Senators' election, but Article L. 52-3 is in Title I of Book I
of Electoral Code, a Title that is not related to Senators' election.67
Therefore, Provision 7 of the Senators' Election Act, was
unconstitutionally inaccessible. 8  The Constitutional Council
explained that this Provision could modify existing legislation only
when related to Senators' elections.69 It held that Provision 7 lacked a
relationship with the Senators' Election Act.7 °
Moreover, the Constitutional Council held that words such as
"proper name" and "representative of a group or political party" are
ambiguous. Indeed, the last paragraph of Article L. 52-3 allows, in
some cases (involving lists of candidates), the inclusion on the ballot
of names of people who are not themselves candidates for election
(the list sponsors). Such inclusion, however, might create confusion
in the minds of voters.7' Therefore it held that the statute was
unconstitutionally unintelligible.72
This case provides a particular example of unintelligible statutes.
The Constitutional Council seems to distinguish cases in which
statutes are drafted in "ambiguous" terms. Not only citizens are
unable to understand the statute, but "ambiguous" words also create
confusion in the minds of voters. "Ambiguity" of a statute raises an
issue different from "unintelligibility." An intelligible statute can still
be ambiguous if it is written in terms susceptible to several
meanings. 3 However, the Council does not provide a separate
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See 15 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 75 (2003).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. ENDICOTT, supra note 1, at 54. Both in English and French the word
"ambiguous" means that a statement is understandable but has two or more meanings.
For the French word, LE PETIT ROBERT gives the following definition: "qui pr6sente deux
ou plusieurs sens possible, dont l'interpr6tation est incertaine." LE PETIT ROBERT,
DICTIONNAIRES LE ROBERT 76 (2000). For the English word, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY gives the following definition: "admitting more than one interpretation or
explanation; of double meaning, or of several possible meanings; equivocal." OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 143 (compact ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1976). Therefore,
"ambiguity" and "unintelligibility" are two different problems.
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ambiguity doctrine. In this case it held that the statute was
unconstitutionally unintelligible since it was written in ambiguous
terms.
4. Local Autonomy
Article 72-2 of the Constitution guarantees financial autonomy to
French territories.74 Article 72-2 states that the "tax revenue and
other own revenue of territorial communities shall, for each category
of territorial community, represent a decisive share of their
revenue." 75 In 2004, the Institutional Act that was to determine the
conditions for implementation of this rule was referred to the
Constitutional Council. Provision 4 of the Act repeated Article 72-2
of the Constitution, but without providing further details.76 It stated
that the "decisive share" should respect two conditions: first it must
guarantee local autonomy, and second it must observe a minimal
threshold that the Parliament provided by referring to the level
recorded during 2003."7
The Constitutional Council held that:
13. Parliament must exercise to the full the powers vested in it
by the Constitution and in particular by Article 34 thereof. The
full exercise of such powers, together with the principle of
clarity of law, which derives from the same Article and object of
constitutional status that the law be intelligible and accessible,
which derives from Article 4, 5, 6 and 16 of the Declaration of
1789, place it under a duty to enact provisions, which are
sufficiently precise and unequivocal. Protection must be
afforded to all from interpretations which run counter to the
Constitution or from the risk of arbitrary decisions, without
leaving it to courts of law or administrative authorities to
determine rules which the Constitution provides should be the
sole preserve of statutory law. 8
The Constitutional Council often uses similar paragraphs to
introduce its quality of law doctrine in order to respond to the
referral. It then continues to discuss the case: "15. Two conditions
set by Provision 4 of the Act referred are tautological and violate both
74. CC decision no. 2004-500DC, July 29, 2004, Rec. 116.
75. 1958 CONST. art. 72-2 (Fr.).
76. CC decision no. 2004-500DC, supra note 74.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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the principle of clarity of the law and the requirement of precision that
Article 72-2 of the Constitution compels[.]"
79
The Constitutional Council invalidated "tautological" provisions
in this case . More than correcting statute drafting, it seems to watch
over Parliament's absentmindedness. The statute, the Council
asserts, must consist of a useful scope. When the Constitution
requires more precision, the statute has to provide them. Parliament
cannot merely repeat what Articles of the Constitution have already
said.8°
In the same line of cases the Council held that the statute should
consist of "normative" dispositions. If Parliament drafts statutes that
are only declaratory and do not consist of a useful scope, the Council
is sometimes willing to strike down these provisions. In 2005,
provision 7 of the Programming Act for the Future of the School was
found unconstitutionally unintelligible and inaccessible since it did
not set "normative" disposition.1 Provision 7 reads:
[T]he aim of the school is the success of all students. The school
must recognize and promote all forms of intelligence in order to
enable students to develop their talents, depending on their
diversity. The school, under the authority of teachers and with
the support of parents, must permit each student to complete
the work required for the development of his intellectual and
manual abilities.8
The Council held that provision 7 described only the aim of the
school without setting any legal obligation.83 Therefore, it violated
the principle of accessibility and intelligibility of the law. Still, this
provision is neither unintelligible nor inaccessible. ' The Council once
again includes within the principle of accessibility and intelligibility of
law different aspects of poorly drafted statutes. Statutes lacking in a
useful scope are far different from unintelligible provisions.
Moreover the Council did not explain how a "declaratory" provision
could obstruct citizens' accessibility to the law. One can easily realize
79. Id.
80. See 17 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 62 (2004).
81. CC decision no. 2005-512DC, April 21, 2005, Rec. 72.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Veronique Champeil-Desplats, N'est pas Normative qui peut. L'Exigence
de Normativit6 dans la Jurisprudence du Conseil Constitutionnel, 21 LES CAHIERS DU
CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 93 (2006).
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that the Council is not only trying to provide a constitutional
requirement in order to improve citizens' accessibility to the law but
it also regulates Parliament's statutory activity.
5. 2005: Finance Act
The Finance Act for 200685 was challenged for being
unintelligible and inaccessible. Members of the National Assembly
and Senators argued that Provision 78 (Article 200-00 A of General
Tax Code) of the statute reached a level of such complexity that it
became unintelligible to the citizen. 6 This Provision introduced some
tax benefits under the income tax law and enumerated different
amounts of the benefits cap according to the composition of different
households.
The Constitutional Council held that the mechanism proposed by
Article 200-00 A of General Tax Code did not respect the principle of
equality since it could treat taxpayers differently in situations that
were objectively identical." This followed directly from the criterion
for the selection of households subject to the cap. Neither the statute
nor Parliament's debate gave the definition for such distinction.
Moreover, this provision was drafted in such a complicated way, by
referring to other Articles of the General Tax Code and by providing
an intricate calculation of the tax benefits, that the Constitutional
Council found it unintelligible and inaccessible to the taxpayers."'
Therefore, it held that this provision was vague and imprecise.
Indeed, the Constitutional Council held that
77. The equality before the law laid down by Article 6 of the
Declaration [of Rights] and the "guarantee of rights" protected
by Article 16 would not be effective if people do not have
sufficient knowledge of rules that are applicable to them and if
those rules were too complex in terms of the ability of citizens
to measure the useful scope. In particular the right to effective
redress before a court will be infringed. Also, this complexity
would restrict the exercise of rights and freedoms guaranteed
by Article 4 of the Declaration. These rights have no bounds
other than those that ensure to the other members of society
the enjoyment of these same rights. Only Law may determine
these bounds. This complexity would also restrict the exercise
85. CC decision no. 2005-530DC, Dec. 29, 2005, Rec. 168.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See 20 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 32 (2005).
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of rights guaranteed by Article 5, under which nothing that is
not forbidden by Law may be hindered, and no one may be
compelled to do what the Law does not ordain.89
Here again the Constitutional Council introduces its reasoning
by first providing constitutional grounds for the quality of law
doctrine. Then, the Council discuses the case:
79. In this case, the tax law demands taxpayers to make choices
and determine the final amount of the tax according to different
options provided by the statute. The principle of equality
requires, however, that the citizen should be able to foresee to a
reasonable degree the amount of tax according to different
options that the statute opens to him;
80. However the complexity of the law can be justified on the
grounds of sufficient general interest.9
This decision is reminiscent of due process principles underlying
much of the U.S.'s vagueness doctrine.9' Every person may be
"presumed to know the law," but unless the law is known and
knowable, the presumption fails. Still, some legal matters are
unavoidably complex or imprecise. That alone does not create
vagueness. Recognizing such limits on the fullness of language, the
Constitutional Council noted in this case that there are statutes in
which unintelligibility is permissible since they deal with complex
problems. The example of the tax law is consonant with the Council's
idea of a complex law.
This excuse also shows the limits of the subjective standard of
"common understanding" behind the quality of law doctrine. One
can easily conclude that this excuse maintains the objective standard
of common understanding. In this case, however, the Constitutional
Council held the law to be unconstitutional since the complexity of
provision 78 was excessive. It suggested that it will examine whether
the complexity of a statute can be justified by a sufficient general
interest. Moreover the requirement of intelligibility is dependent
upon the sensitivity of whom the law is directed." Therefore, the
Council held that:
89. CC decision no. 2005-530DC, supra note 85.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. See discussion infra Part II.C.
92. 20 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 32,35 (2005).
Winter 20101 VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
82. Yet, in this case, Provision 28 is directed not only to the tax
administration, but also to taxpayers, who are required to
calculate in advance the amount of the tax;
84. Therefore the complexity of these rules results in the length
of provision 78 and in its imbricate drafting that it becomes
unintelligible for the taxpayer, and sometimes ambiguous for
the professional. This provision, as it referees to other Articles
of General Tax Code, would not insure the legal stability and
would lead to future misunderstandings, complaints and
litigations.93
The U.S. Supreme Court seems to accept the same argument
when it says "there are areas of human conduct where, by the nature
of the problems presented, legislatures cannot establish standards
with great precision. '9 4 In Smith v. Goguen, the Court wrote that a
statute, such as one barring disorderly conduct, might require
imprecise language, "requiring as it does an on-the-spot assessment of
the need to keep the order."95
Even if both French and American judges admit the same excuse
for vagueness, their arguments are slightly different. First, these cases
relate to different statutes (tax law for the Council and criminal law
for the Court).
Second, the Constitutional Council accepts the inability of the
legislator to draft intelligible laws in complex areas whereas the
Supreme Court points out the limits of the language to precisely
define the meaning of the term that describes a human conduct. The
Council accepts that sometimes statutes can be drafted in sufficiently
precise terms but cannot help but be somewhat complicated. For the
Supreme Court the "open texture" of some statutes cannot be
sharpened to an unequivocal statement of what they require.96
C. 2008: Private Finance Initiative Act
The Constitutional Council invalidated proprio motu (on its own
motion) provision 16 of The Private Finance Initiative Act ("PFI") on
93. CC decision no. 2005-530DC, supra note 85.
94. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,581 (1974).
95. Id.
96. Culver, supra note 1. "Open texture" of a statute means that the statute is
susceptible of two or more interpretations. Id. Therefore, judges often have to interpret
statutes. That does not necessarily mean that the statute is broad or vague.
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the grounds that it was unconstitutionally intelligible (despite the fact
that the Member of National Assembly and Senators in their referral
did not challenge the Act on such ground). 9 The Council found that
this article had mentioned twice a superior threshold for PFI
contracts, even though it had to set an inferior and a superior
threshold.98 The Council held that the legislature intended to define
two procedures, supposed alternatives, below and above a threshold,
however. The article referred in both cases to the contracts whose
amounts are "above the threshold."'  Since the legislator failed to
draft the right words, it violated the principle of intelligibility and
accessibility of the law. Therefore, the last two paragraphs of Article
16 of the PFI Act were invalidated.1"
This case suggests that the Council will in the future strike down
drafting errors. Moreover, the Constitutional Council challenges the
provision of this statute proprio motu as it usually does in matters of
public policies (ordre public).
For the Supreme Court, a statute is vague "if it fails to provide a
reasonable opportunity for people of ordinary intelligence to
understand what conduct it prohibits" or "if it authorizes or even
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. ' '  The
Constitutional Council seems to provide similar prongs for its quality
of law doctrine.
II. The Supreme Court's Vagueness Cases
A. The First Amendment
Vagueness challenges can involve either a "facial" challenge to a
law or an "as applied" challenge. The "facial" challenge concerns a
claim that a law is facially unconstitutional and should be struck down
in its entirety.t" The "facial" challenge is controversial because the
claimant before the court may not be arguing that a particular law is
vague as to him, but may ask the court to strike down the law because
97. CC decision no. 2008-567DC, July 24, 2008, Rec. 341.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57 (1998).
102. RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 87-90 (2d ed. 2006).
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it is vague as applied to others. °3 Therefore the Court has to consider
speculation about possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not
before the court.
One may see in "facial" challenges a review similar to the French
constitutional review. Indeed, both the Constitutional Council and
the Supreme Court in facial challenges deal with hypothetical cases,
and both strike down statutes in their entirety. Nevertheless, the
French Council does not exactly resolve hypothetical cases. It
confronts statutes with the Constitution and it is cut off from any
concrete case. Therefore, its reasoning remains abstract. In dealing
with a facial challenge, the Supreme Court hears a concrete case and
has to give a precise reasoning even if at the same time it "resolves"
hypothetical cases.' °4  Yet, courts are generally reluctant to let
individuals assert the rights of others, and the Supreme Court has a
very strict interpretation of standing rules.' Vagueness doctrine
under the First Amendment is among these rare cases when the
Supreme Court is willing to consider facial challenges.0 6
The Supreme Court is inclined to apply the vagueness doctrine
particularly when free speech is implicated. Cases in which statutes
targeting Communists and establishing loyalty oaths were challenged
103. Vagueness challenges are often combined with overbreadth claims. See, e.g.,
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1972). Laws restricting speech are overbroad when
they suppress more speech than necessary to accomplish the state's legitimate goals. Laws
suffering from overbreadth, just as vague laws, are often considered «< on their face. See
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1971).
104. Stone, supra note 12, at 2744. He argues that traditional differences of judicial
review in U.S. and Europe are in deep crises. Not only has European constitutional
review become more concrete but also American judicial review has become increasingly
abstract. In order to illustrate his point of view he explains two situations: the procedure
of declaratory or injunctive relief and facial constitutional challenges. He further argues
that these two situations are examples of an "abstract review" by the U.S. Supreme Court,
even if American constitutional law does not use the term "abstract review." For our
purposes, it still remains an important difference between facial challenges and abstract
review. Abstract review is cut off from any concrete litigation. In declaratory or
injunctive relief and in facial challenges judges have an idea of how the statute is being
applied, which is never the case for the French Council. Moreover, invalidating a statute
on its face does not necessarily mean that the review is abstract. For example, the new
procedure of "question prdjudicielle" grounds the Constitutional Council in concrete
review activities but the Council still deals, in this case, with facial constitutional
challenges. When the Council invalidates a statute, it is always on its face, even after this
new procedure. Therefore, American facial constitutional challenges will look more like
Constitutional Council cases' raised on the grounds of the preliminary question procedure.
105. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 419 (1975) (rejecting jus tertii standing for
injured parties).
106. RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, supra note 102.
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on the grounds of vagueness are revealing of the Supreme Court's
position."
In Baggett v. Bullit °8 the Supreme Court asserted that "[t]he vice
of unconstitutional vagueness is further aggravated where, as here,
the statute in question operates to inhibit the exercise of individual
freedoms affirmatively protected by the Constitution. We are dealing
with indefinite statutes whose terms, even narrowly constructed, abut
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms."1°9 In
Baggett, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a 1931
Washington statute requiring teachers, as a condition of employment,
to take a loyalty oath."' The Supreme Court held that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague.' It ruled that the oath was lacking in
"terms susceptible of objective measurement and failed to inform as
to what the State commanded or forbade.... 2 The Supreme Court
wrote, "Persons required to swear they understand this oath may
quite reasonably conclude that any person who aids the Communist
Party or teaches or advises known members of the Party is a
subversive person because such teaching or advice may at some
future date aid the activities of the Party." ' Therefore, the statute
did not provide an "ascertainable standard of conduct."1 '4  The
Supreme Court added, "the challenged oath is not open to one or a
few interpretations, but to an indefinite number."'15
Another case illustrates the risk of "arbitrary enforcement." It is
usually affirmed that criminal statutes are subject to stricter
vagueness analysis than civil statutes. Subject to an even stricter
standard are criminal statutes that reach expression protected by the
First Amendment. In Kolender v. Lawson,16 the Supreme Court
invalidated a California statute requiring persons who loiter or
wander on the streets to provide a "credible and reliable"
identification. The Supreme Court held that:
107. Id.
108. Baggett v. Bullit, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
109. Id. at 372.
110. Id. at 371.
111. Id. at 372.
112. Id. at 367 (quoting Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961)).
113. Id. at 368.
114. Id. at 372.
115. Id. at 378.
116. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1982). For the free assembly and association,
see Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1970).
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As presently drafted and construed by the state courts, the
statute contains no standard for determining what a suspect has
to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a "credible
and reliable" identification. As such, the statute vests virtually
complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine
whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and must be
permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to
arrest. 117
Therefore the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it
"encouraged arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with
sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the
statute.""8
In some other cases the Supreme Court found that a statute
violated both prongs of the vagueness test. In City of Chicago v.
Morales1 9 Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that an ordinance
which required a police officer, "on observing a person whom he
reasonably believed to be a criminal street gang member loitering in
any public place with one or more other persons, to order all such
persons to disperse, and made failure to obey such an order a
violation," was unconstitutionally vague in falling to provide fair
notice of prohibited conduct.120 The ordinance was also impermissibly
vague in failing to establish "minimum guidelines for enforcement.' 121
B. Prior Restraints
Another line of cases that concern the danger of arbitrary
decision in U.S. constitutional law is found in the prior restraint
doctrine. The Supreme Court has held that a statute that gives
"unfettered discretion" to government officials to grant or withhold
permits for speech in public places is tantamount to a "prior
restraint." Prior restraints are generally forbidden under the First
Amendment.
In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing,122 the Supreme
Court held that a licensing statute that:
117. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
118. Id. at 361.
119. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. at 60.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added).
122. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing, 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
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[V]ests unbridled discretion in a government official over
whether to permit or deny expressive activity.., constitutes a
prior restraint and may result in censorship, engendering risks
to free expression... The mere existence of the licensor's
unfettered discretion, coupled with the power of prior restraint,
intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the
discretion and power are never actually abused.2 3
In Lakewood, a newspaper company challenged the
constitutionality of a city ordinance that regulated news racks on
public sidewalks. That ordinance gave the mayor the authority to
grant or deny applications for annual news rack permits.124  The
Supreme Court held that "giving the mayor unfettered discretion to
deny a permit application and to condition the permit on any
additional terms he deems 'necessary and reasonable,' to be
unconstitutional."12
5
The ordinance was drafted in vague terms and failed to provide
precise standards of conduct for authorities that had to enforce it.
The Supreme Court said that the unfettered discretion given to the
mayor could lead to arbitrary enforcement of the ordinance since one
could not presume that the mayor would act in good faith and adhere
to standards 'that are not explicitly stated on the face of the
ordinance.126 Therefore, the Court explained that the risk of arbitrary
enforcement followed from the "unfettered discretion" given to the
mayor, which itself resulted from the statute's vagueness.127
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the French Constitutional
Council is rarely asked to resolve cases involving individual rights and
quality of law issues. As the above First Amendment cases
demonstrate, the U.S. Supreme Court is more concerned about the
broadness of the law. The French Constitutional Council, by
contrast, focuses on the complexity of the law. This is probably the
123. Id. at 755-56.
124. If the mayor denied an application, he was required to "state the reasons for such
denial." Id. at 793 n.18. In the event the mayor grants an application, the city was asked
to issue an annual permit subject to several terms and conditions. Among them were: (1)
approval of the news rack design by the city's Architectural Board of Review; (2) an
agreement by the news rack owner to indemnify the city against any liability arising from
the news rack, guaranteed by a $100,000 insurance policy to that effect; and (3) any "other
terms and conditions deemed necessary and reasonable by the Mayor." Id. at 753-54.
125. Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 770.
127. Id. at 772.
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result of its abstract judicial review. The Constitutional Council
cannot, in an abstract case, appreciate the broadness of the law and
has to limit itself to challenges based on poorly drafted or intricate
statutory requirements. Therefore, Constitutional Council cases do
not deal with statutory vagueness challenges in the way that the
American Supreme Court does. Nonetheless, the French quality of
law doctrine provides an outcome that is similar to the American
vagueness doctrine. The Council has explained, as will be discussed
later, the constitutional requirements of intelligibility and accessibility
as preventing citizens from arbitrary enforcement of statutes. Thus,
even if statutory vagueness comes in different forms, it always affects
citizens in the same way. Both the Constitutional Council and the
Supreme Court consider in their respective doctrines different
sources of statutory vagueness, but they seem to reconcile them with
similar constitutional requirements.
C. Due Process
The American vagueness doctrine finds its root in the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Supreme Court has held that due process implies that legislation must
meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity.
In Kolender, the Court wrote that the California statute required
that "suspicious" persons satisfy some undefined identification
requirement, or face criminal punishment. Although due process
does not require "impossible standards" of clarity, this is not a case
where further details in the statutory language are either impossible
or impractical. 9 Therefore, the statute was unconstitutionally vague
on its face within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it failed to clarify what it
contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a "credible
and reliable" identification.3
128. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
129. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361.
130. Id. at 353. However, in Hibel v. Nevada, the Supreme Court held that defendant's
arrest for refusal to identify himself, in violation of Nevada law, did not violate his Fifth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hibel v. Nevada, 542 U.S.
177 (2004). Quoting Kolender, the Supreme Court reminded that a statute is void when it
provides no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with it. Id. at 184.
In Hibel, the petitioner did not allege that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.
Moreover, the Supreme Court said that the Nevada statute was narrower and more
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Even if in France a Due Process Clause does not exist, due
process as a component of the rule of law (Etat de droit) derives from
several articles of the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights
("DHCR"). Article 16 of the DHCR refers to the "guarantee of
rights" which involves classic maxims that are protected under the
Due Process Clause. 131 Indeed, the Council has held that Article 16
includes the right to a fair trial.'32 For example, it ruled that the
principle of the rights of the defense and the right to effective redress
before the Court both derive from the same article.
13
This interpretation of Article 16 of the DHCR seems to be
analogous to the American requirement of procedural due process.
The Constitutional Council has not precisely invoked due process as a
requirement for the quality of law doctrine. Still, since the Council
has held that the principle of intelligibility of law derives also from
Article 16 of the DHCR, which refers to the "guarantee of rights,"
one may suppose that the Constitutional Council has found in this
article a similar requirement as the Supreme Court. Yet, the
Constitutional Council did not explicitly explain how an unintelligible
statute might violate the "guarantee of rights" protected under
Article 16 of the DHCR.
D. Retroactive Effects of Statutes
Despite the danger inherent in retroactive legislation, the
Supreme Court has held that the U.S. Congress, within constitutional
limits, has the power to enact laws with retroactive effect.'34 In order
precise than the California statute in Kolender. Id. at 185. Whereas the California statute
required a suspect to give the officer "credible and reliable" identification, the Nevada
statute, as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, required that a suspect disclose his
name. Id. at 185. Even if the Supreme Court is sometimes willing to recognize
constitutional limitations on the scope and operation of stop and identify statutes (e.g.,
Kolender), in Hibel the Supreme Court held that officer's request to disclose suspect's
name was commonsense inquiry and did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 185.
131. THIERRY S. RENOUX, MICHEL DE VILLIERS, CODE CONSTITUTIONNEL,
LEXISNEXIS, Paris, 2005, at 179.
132. CC decision no. 2004-492DC, Mar. 2, 2004, Rec. 66.
133. Id.
134. Still, both American and French constitutional laws contain a strict prohibition on
the enactment of retroactive criminal statutes. In France this prohibition derives from
Article 8 of the DHCR. In American constitutional law this precept is reflected in Ex Post
Facto Clause. For one applicable to Congress, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, and
another applicable to state legislatures, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1). Nonetheless, it
has long been established, in American constitutional law, that Congress can pass statutes
that limit a person's rights based on past criminal convictions. See generally Bugajewitz v.
Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 608-09 (1913) (upholding a law that provided for the deportation of
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to determine the permissible retroactive effect of a statute, the
Supreme Court provided a test in Landgraf v. USI Film
Productions,'35 whose rationale tracks vagueness issues. "The first
step in determining whether a statute has an impermissible
retroactive effect is to ascertain whether Congress has directed with
requisite clarity that the law be applied retrospectively., 136 As the
Court has written, the standard for finding such unambiguous
direction is a demanding one. The only cases where the Supreme
Court has found retroactive effect adequately authorized by statute
are cases in which the statute sustained only one interpretation. In
INS v. St. Cyr"7 the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General
could not retroactively apply the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") § 304(b) 3 since Congress
failed for lack of clarity by not precisely requiring that the law be
applied retrospectively. 9
In this case, a citizen of Haiti pleaded guilty in a state court to a
charge of selling a controlled substance in violation of Connecticut
law. '4 This conviction made him deportable. Under pre-IIRIRA law
applicable at the time of his conviction, St. Cyr would have been
eligible for a waiver of deportation at the discretion of Attorney
General. 4 ' However, removal proceedings against him were not
a women convicted of prostitution); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1898)
(upholding a public health law which prohibited a person convicted of a felony from
practicing medicine) (citing Nancy Morawetz, Determining the Retroactive Effect of Laws
Altering the Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1743, 1743 (2003)).
135. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
136. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 315,316 (2001) (citing Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343,352 (1999)).
137. Id.
138. Pub.L. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
139. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315 ; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). In
this case, the Supreme Court held that Congress expressly provided that subsections (e)
(2) and (e) (3) of section 1005 of Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No.
109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, applied to pending cases. But it chose-after having been
presented with the option-not to so provide the same for subsection (e) (1). Referring to
the "negative inference" principle, the Supreme Court explained that "where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 578 (quoting Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). Since the Congress did not expressly provide that
subsection (e) (1) applied to pending cases, "the omission is an integral part of the
statutory scheme that muddies whatever 'plain meaning' may be discerned from blinkered
study of subsection (e) (1) alone." Id. at 584.
140. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289.
141. Id. at 315.
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commenced until April 10, 1997, which is after IIRIRA became
effective.' Therefore, the Attorney General interpreted the new
legislation as depriving him of the discretion to grant such a waiver. 3
The Supreme Court held that Congress did not precisely identify
which set of proceedings would apply to aliens whose exclusion or
deportation proceedings began prior to the new law's effective date.1"
It added that Congress made some provisions of IIRIRA expressly
applicable to prior convictions, but did not do so in regard to §
304(b). For the Supreme Court this was an indication "that Congress
did not definitively decide the issue of § 304's retroactive application
to pre-enactment convictions."'45
The Supreme Court delivers in this case another approach to
vagueness, which seems to reinforce the requirement of clearness in
cases involving aliens. In this case, the Supreme Court, before
analyzing the second prong of the Landgraf test, held that:
[T]he presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous
statutory provisions, buttressed by the longstanding principle of
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in
favor of aliens, forecloses the conclusion that, in enacting §
304(b), Congress itself has affirmatively considered the
potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined
that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing
benefits. 46
In France, the Constitutional Council applies the equivalent of
"strict scrutiny" when looking at the retroactive effect of statutes.
Under Article 8 of the DHCR "the Law must proscribe only the
punishments that are strictly and evidently necessary; and no one may
be punished except by virtue of a Law drawn up and promulgated
before the offense is committed, and legally applied.' ' 47 Therefore,
the Constitutional Council has held in many cases that the criminal
law cannot have a retroactive effect unless it has an in mitius
retroactive effect. 148 The strict scrutiny of retroactive effect does not
involve an assessment on quality of law grounds as the American
142. Id.
143. Id. at 297.
144. Id. at 320.
145. Id. (citation omitted).
146. Id. (citations omitted).
147. Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789, art. 8 (1789) (Fr.).
148. "In mitius retroactive effect" means that the new statute is favorable to plaintiffs.
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Supreme Court cases do. Nevertheless, the principle that only the
Law defines crimes and punishments derives from Article 8 of the
DHCR. The Constitutional Council has held that according to this
principle the criminal law, in order to avoid arbitrary decisions, must
define crimes and punishments in sufficiently precise terms.'49 This
obligation emanates from Article 8 and is not a component of the
principle of accessibility and intelligibility of the law. For the
Constitutional Council, the clarity must be inherent to the criminal
law. This reasoning affirms once again the Constitutional Council's
position. The Constitutional Council fails to provide a global
vagueness doctrine and a unique constitutional requirement. Even if
the necessity of clarity of law appears in different cases, it is dispersed
in multiple articles of the Constitution and does not provide a precise
rationale.
III. Similar Prongs for the Vagueness Test and
the Quality of Law Test
A. Standards of 'Ordinary Intelligence' and 'Sufficient Knowledge'
Vagueness and unnecessary complexity in law breaches the core
of the rule of law since it does not protect our current expectations
about the future legal consequences of our conduct. Indeed, the law
has to be drafted in clear terms so that the public (i.e., people of
ordinary intelligence) are aware of what it prohibits. Therefore, the
Supreme Court has established a principle of "ordinary intelligence"
in clarity to satisfy due process.15 ° This means that the law must
provide notice to people of ordinary intelligence for its proscriptions.
For the Supreme Court this prong is the first requirement for the
vagueness test.
The Supreme Court has written that, "because we assume that
man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair
warning. '
The French Constitutional Council has adopted a similar, albeit
less explicit, principle. It requires that the citizen should have a
149. CC decision no. 80-127DC, Jan. 19-20, 1981, Rec. 15.
150. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 613-14 (1970).
151. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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"sufficient knowledge" of laws that apply to him.152  The
commentators of Constitutional Council's cases interpreted this
prong as providing to the quality of law doctrine the requirement that
derives from the Latin term of art: nemo censetur legem ignorare
(every man is presumed to know the law).153 But, depending on the
case, the Constitutional Council makes use of different approaches to
explain the standard of "sufficient knowledge."
In 2004, the Council held that the principle of accessibility and
intelligibility of law implies that the law should have no double
meaning. Therefore, the legislature should use unequivocal
language. In some other cases the Constitutional Council replaced
the requirement of "sufficient knowledge" by a new formulation: a
statute must contain provisions which are "sufficiently precise and
unequivocal. 55  The purpose of the standard of "sufficient
knowledge" seems to be similar to the American standard of
"ordinary intelligence." Indeed, when the Constitutional Council
asserts that the law should be drafted in "sufficient" clear terms, the
adjective "sufficient" refers to the ability of an ordinary citizen to
measure the scope of the law.
However, the Constitutional Council has not yet precisely ruled
whether the standard of "common understanding" is an objective
standard or a subjective one. Scholars pointed out that the principle
of intelligibility and accessibility of law refers to a subjective standard
of "common understanding" since the words "intelligibility" and
"accessibility" involve citizens' positive action towards statutes'
meaning. 56 But Constitutional Council cases do not furnish further
details.
The U.S. Supreme Court has dealt with the same issue, namely
considering whether the standard of "ordinary intelligence" is an
objective or a subjective standard. In Coates v. City of Cincinnati,57
the plaintiffs challenged an ordinance on vagueness grounds. The
ordinance provided that it "shall be unlawful for three or more
persons to assemble, except at a public meeting of citizens, on any
sidewalks... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to
152. CC decision no. 99-421 DC, supra note 43.
153. Milano, supra note 41, at 641.
154. CC decision no. 2001-455DC, supra note 45.
155. Id.; see also CC decision no. 2004-503DC, Aug. 12, 2004, Rec. 144.
156. Mathieu & Verpeaux, supra note 47, at 17.
157. 402 U.S. 611.
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persons passing by."'58 The Ohio Court of Appeals explained that
"the standard of conduct which it specifies is not dependent upon
each complainant's sensitivity.' 5 9 The Supreme Court held that the
construction put upon the ordinance by the state court was an
unexplained conclusion since "it did not indicate upon whose
sensitivity a violation does depend-the sensitivity of the judge or
jury, the sensitivity of the arresting officer, or the sensitivity of a
hypothetical reasonable man."' ' ° The Court noted that "conduct that
annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is
vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his
conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative conduct, but
rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all."16'
The Constitutional Council does not provide a precise definition
of the principle of intelligibility and accessibility of law. Even if the
standard of "sufficient knowledge" seems to be similar to the
vagueness doctrine's first prong, the Constitutional Council does not
always explain in its cases how a vague statute could deprive citizens
of the rights protected under Articles 4, 5, and 16 of the DHCR.
In sum, one can see that the standard established by the Supreme
Court is more sophisticated than the Constitutional Council's test.
This is because the French Constitutional Council has failed to
provide a thorough explanation of the reasoning behind the quality of
law doctrine.
B. Prevention of Discriminatory and Arbitrary Decisions
According to the U.S. Supreme Court a statute can be held
unconstitutionally vague for two independent reasons. A statute is
vague if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits or "if it
authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.' ' 62 Therefore:
[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who
apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
158. Id at 611 n.1 (quoting Section 901-L6, Code of Ordinances of the City of Cincinnati (1956)).
159. Id. at 613 (citation omitted).
160. Id.
161. d. at 614.
162. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (citation omitted).
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hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discriminatory application. 161
The danger of arbitrary enforcement appears also in
Constitutional Council's cases. In 2007, the Members of the National
Assembly and Senators addressed a referral to the Constitutional
Council against the Act relating to the control of immigration,
integration and asylum." Section 13 of the statute required genetic
testing for certain visa applicants in order to establish the family
relationship between the host in France and the applicant. 165  The
parties making the referral argued that the provision of section 13
violated both Article 34 of the Constitution and the principle of
intelligibility and accessibility of law. 166 Indeed, they argued, the
legislature failed to act within the scope of its powers and abdicated
its power leaving to a decree (executive act) to draw up the list of
countries in which the genetic testing of persons for identification
purposes shall be introduced on an experimental basis.67 Moreover,
they argued that Parliament did not provide sufficient legal
168protections for the genetic testing of persons. Therefore, thisprocedure was unintelligible. The Constitutional Council held:
19. Parliament must exercise to the full the powers vested in it
by the Constitution and in particular by Article 34 thereof. The
full exercise of such powers, together with the object of
constitutional status that the law be intelligible and accessible,
which derives from Article 4, 5, 6 and 16 of the Declaration of
1789, place it under a duty to enact provisions which are
sufficiently precise and unequivocal. Protection must be
afforded to all from interpretations which run counter to the
Constitution or from the risk of arbitrary decisions, without
leaving it to courts of law or administrative authorities to
determine rules which the Constitution provides should be the
sole preserve of statute law.16 9
163. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (emphasis added).
164. CC decision no. 2007-557DC, Nov. 15, 2007, Rec. 360.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.; see also CC decision no. 2006-540DC, June 27, 2006, Rec. 88 (Loi Relative aux
Droits d'Auteur et aux Droits Voisins dans la Socidtd de l'Information [Act pertaining to
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society] (emphasis added)).
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In this case, the Constitutional Council disallowed the
petitioners' referral. 17  Nevertheless, it seems to provide the same
argument as the American Supreme Court. According to the
Constitutional Council, the quality of law doctrine requires that a
statute should be clear enough to prevent citizens from the risk of
arbitrary decisions. Therefore, as the Supreme Court said, the
legislature must establish guidelines to govern law enforcement" ' inorder to protect citizens from all forms of unjust enforcement. 172
C. Intelligible Principle Doctrine
In cases concerning the delegation of legislative power to federal
agencies (or executive power), the Supreme Court has held that when
Congress delegates legislative power it must provide criteria-
"intelligible principles"-to guide the agency's exercise of
discretion. ' Thus, vague or overly broad delegations, which lack an
"intelligible principle" to guide the agency, may violate Separation of
Powers principles.
Overly broad or vague delegations of power to agencies outside
of the legislative branch 7 1 undermine the structural protections
provided in Article I of the U.S. Constitution, such as bicameralism
and presentment.'75 The requirement of an "intelligible principle" in
legislation delegating power assures that basic policy is being made by
Congress and not by the President or private parties.
This doctrine appeared during the New Deal period as the "non-
delegation" doctrine. Yet, the Supreme Court invalidated only two
statutes for over-delegating legislative power. In Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan the Court held that a statute did not literally provide any
guidance for the exercise of president's discretion.'76 As a result, it
170. See 21 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 13 (2006).
171. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 533, 573-74 (1974); see also Goldsmith, supra note
3, at 288-90.
172. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
173. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
319-22 (Gaithersburg ed., Aspen Publishers 2002) (1997).
174. Most administrative agencies in the U.S. reside within the Executive Branch.
Administrative agencies (les autoritds administratives ind~pendantes) in France are new.
They first appeared in 1978. They also reside within the Executive Branch. See LES
AUTORITtS ADMINISTRATIVES INDtPENDANTES, 52 ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU
CONSEIL D'TAT (E.D.C.E.) 2001.
175. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House...
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President ....
176. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1934).
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invalidated a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act
("NIRA") that authorized the president to prohibit the shipment in
interstate commerce of oil produced in excess of state-imposed
production quotas. Not only was the statute an impermissible
delegation of legislative power, but it also failed to provide any
standard in order to limit president's discretion. In Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated another
regulation adopted under the NIRA.'77  The Court held that
"Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested."178 The
regulation was therefore found unconstitutional as an impermissible
delegation of legislative power. The Supreme Court admitted the
need for regulations to deal with the "host of details with which the
national legislature cannot deal directly"179 but it further explained
that "the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such
provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has
been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the
limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is
to be maintained.""'8 Although the non-delegation doctrine has not
been overruled, in the more than seventy years since Panama
Refining, the Court has not found a single federal law invalid on this
basis. '8
In Mistretta v. United States,82 the Court upheld the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, which, inter alia, created the United States
Sentencing Commission as an independent body in the Judicial
Branch with power to promulgate binding sentencing guidelines
establishing a range of determinate sentences for all categories of
federal offenses and defendants according to specific and detailed
factors. The Supreme Court held that:
In light of our approval of broad delegations, we harbor no
doubt that Congress' delegation of authority to the Sentencing
Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet
constitutional requirements. Congress charged the Commission
with three goals: to "assure the meeting of the purposes of
177. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
178. Id. at 529.
179. Id. at 530.
180. Id. (citation omitted).
181. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 173, at 321.
182. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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sentencing as set forth" in the Act; to "provide certainty and
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records.., while maintaining sufficient flexibility to
permit individualized sentences" where appropriate; and to
"reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of
human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.
In addition the Supreme Court said, "Congress prescribed the
specific tool (the guidelines system) for the Commission to use in
regulating sentencing" and "to guide the Commission in its
formulation of offense categories."' 8  Therefore, the Act was
constitutional since it "set forth more than merely an 'intelligible
principle' or minimal standards."'85
The Supreme Court provided the "intelligible principle" test in
1928 as the measurement standard for the delegation of legislative
power.86 In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute,87 the Supreme Court included the "intelligible principle"
within the non-delegation doctrine. It held that:
[T]he non-delegation doctrine serves three important functions.
First, and most abstractly, it ensures to the extent consistent
with orderly governmental administration that important
choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our
Government most responsive to the popular will. Second, the
doctrine guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds it
necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that
authority with an "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of
the delegated discretion. Third, and derivative of the second,
the doctrine ensures that courts charged with reviewing the
exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to test
that exercise against ascertainable standards.'88
Nevertheless, even if the Supreme Court has a broad
interpretation of the impermissible delegation of legislative power,
the "intelligible principle" requirement seems to be the most
183. Id. at 374 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 379.
186. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
187. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
188. Id. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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significant constitutional limit on congressional grants of power to
administrative agencies.
In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n,8 9 the Supreme Court
held that: "Congress does not alter the fundamental details of a
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not,
one might say, hide elephants in mouse holes."' 9 In this case, the
Supreme Court ruled that "[ifn a delegation challenge, the
constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated pure
legislative power to an agency. Article 1, section 1, of the
Constitution vests all legislative Powers herein granted... in a
Congress of the United States. This text permits no delegation of
powers." 19 Therefore, the Supreme Court wrote "when Congress
confers decision making authority upon agencies Congress must lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to act is directed to conform."'9'
However, in that case the Supreme Court upheld section 109 of
the Clean Air Act that instructed the Environmental Protection
Agency to set "ambient air quality standards." The Court
unanimously rejected the challenge to section 109 of the CAA as an
impermissible delegation of legislative power. Justice Scalia wrote for
the Court that the "EPA... set air quality standards at the level that
is requisite-that is, not lower or higher than it is necessary-to
protect the public health with adequate margin of safety, fits
comfortably within the scope of discretion permitted by our
precedent."' 93
This requirement seems to be similar to the Constitutional
Council's principle of intelligibility of law. Both courts use the notion
of "intelligibility." The Constitutional Council asserts that
Parliament must set intelligible statutes in order to prevent courts of
law or administrative authorities' interpretation of rules in order to
avoid arbitrary decisions.9 In the same way, the Supreme Court
requires that Congress give an "intelligible principle" to guide the
agency in its exercise of discretion.
When looking closely at the Supreme Court's test for
"intelligible principles," this doctrine seems to be analogous to the
189. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
190. Id. at 472.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 476.
194. CC decision no. 2007-557DC, supra note 164.
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French clarity of law principle. Even though the Constitutional
Council renounced its clarity of law doctrine, this doctrine could still
reappear as a separate doctrine from the principle of intelligibility
and accessibility of law. Therefore, the comparison with the
American intelligible principle provides a new reading of the French
clarity of law principle.
Indeed, on one hand, behind these two doctrines (clarity of law
and intelligible principle) stands the idea of the vague delegation of
legislative power. For the Supreme Court, the intelligibility doctrine
is a limit on insufficiently defined delegations. The Constitutional
Council had the same reasoning since it declared that the principle of
clarity of law derived from Article 34 of the Constitution. Under the
French Constitution, Parliament must act within its enumerated
powers, which are listed in Article 34 of the Constitution.19 ' The
Government has general powers under Article 37 of the
Constitution.196 Therefore, the Council held that Parliament would
violate Article 37 of the Constitution by acting in matters not
enumerated by Article 34 (incompdtence positive).197 However, the
Council has always given a very broad interpretation of matters
enumerated by Article 34.19' But above all the Constitutional Council
195. 1958 CONST. art. 34 (Fr.) (Statutes should determine the rules concerning: Civic
rights and fundamental guarantees granted to citizens for the exercise of their civil
liberties; freedom, pluralism and the independence of the media; obligations imposed for
the purpose of national defense upon the person and property of citizens; nationality; the
status and capacity of persons; matrimonial property system; inheritance and gifts;
determination of serious crimes and other major offences and the penalties they carry;
criminal procedure; amnesty; the setting up of new categories of courts and the status of
members of the Judiciary; the base, rates and methods of collection of all types of taxes;
and the issuing of currency. Statutes shall also determine the rules governing: The system
for electing members of the Houses of Parliament, local assemblies and the representative
bodies for French nationals living abroad, as well as the condition for holding elective
offices and positions for members of the deliberative assemblies of the territorial
communities; the setting up of categories of public legal entities; the fundamental
guarantees granted to civil servants and members of the Armed Forces; nationalization of
companies and the transfer of ownership of companies from the public to the private
sector. Statutes shall also lay down the basic principles of: The general organization of
national defense; the self-government of territorial communities, their powers and
revenue; education; the preservation of the environment; systems of ownership, property
rights and civil and commercial obligations; employment law, Trade Union law and Social
Security.).
196. 1958 CONST. art. 37 (Fr.) (Matters other than those coming under the scope of
statute law should be matters for regulation.).
197. CC decision no. 68-35DC, January 30, 1968, Rec. 19.
198. See Louis FAVOREU, Preface to JEAN BOULOUiS, LE DOMAINE DE LA LOt ET
DU RItGLEMENT (1981). See also JtROME TREMEAU, LA RESERVE DE LOT (1997).
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has held that Parliament could not delegate its power." Rather, the
legislature itself had to create rules in those matters, which Article 34
of the Constitution mandates should be the sole preserve of the
statute. This reasoning is known as "incompdtence negative"doctrine.' °°
First, Parliament cannot explicitly delegate its legislative power,
except under Article 38.201 Second it has to exercise the full powers
vested in it by Article 34. This requirement is meant to avoid implicit
delegations of legislative power.2 When the principle of clarity of
law appeared, the Constitutional Council used it at the same time as
this second aspect of the "incompetence ndgative" doctrine.03 When
drafted in terms lacking sufficient clarity, a statute may encourage
discretionary interpretation and implementation/n The Council
seems to say that if the executive has to interpret and implant a broad
statute, this inevitably includes an implicit and thus impermissible
205delegation of legislative power.
But the Council did not explicitly describe its clarity of law
doctrine, but rather confused it with the principle of intelligibility and
accessibility of law.2' Therefore, scholars did not analyze the
principle of clarity of law as an additional prong to the constitutional
non-delegation requirement but as a component of the quality of law
movement undertaken by the Council. 27 In consequence, the U.S.
intelligible principle doctrine provides a new understanding of the
French clarity of law doctrine. The Supreme Court and
Constitutional Council use similar prongs for their respective non-
delegation doctrines.
199. CC decision no. 75-56DC, July 23, 1975, Rec. 22.
200. TREMEAU, see supra note 198.
201. See supra note 57.
202. Florence Galletti, Existe-t-il une obligation de bien l~giferer? Propos sur
"l'incompetence negative du l~gislateur dans la jurisprudence du Conseil Constitutionnel, 58
REVUE FRANQAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL [R.F.D.C.] 387, 387 (2004) (Fr.).
203. Georges Schmitter, L'Incomp~tence Negative du Lggislateur et des Autorites
Administratives, 5 ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE
(A.I.J.C.) 387 (1989) (Fr.).
204. See Milano, supra note 41, at 650. See also Lucienne-Victoire Fernandez-
Maublanc, Accessibilite et Intelligibilite de la Loi ou la Rehabilitation de la Loi par le
Conseil Constitutionnel, in LA CONSTITUTION ET SES VALEURS, MELANGES EN
L'HONNEUR DE DIMITRI-GEORGES LAVAROFF 163 (2005) (Fr.).
205. Fernandez-Maublanc, supra note 204, at 168.
206. Milano, supra note 41, at 650.
207. See, e.g., Daniel Chamussy, Le Conseil Constitituionnel et la Qualitg de la
Legislation, REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 1037 (2004) (Fr.).
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On the other hand, the U.S. intelligible principle doctrine and
French clarity of law doctrine seem to affirm that statutes should be
self-contained. The "incompleteness" of a statute raises another
vagueness question. "Incompleteness" is "ordinarily a feature of
explanations, reports, descriptions, and so on."2 8 For both the U.S.
Supreme Court and Constitutional Council, this form of vagueness is
tightly linked to, even if not expressly affirmed by, the principle of
separation of powers since it stands behind the non-delegation
doctrine. The impermissible delegation of legislative power is a
violation of the principle of separation of powers since it leads to a
concentration of powers. A lack of clarity can generate an implicit
delegation of legislative power and in consequence violate the core of
the principle of separation of powers under the French constitution. 2°9
The law should, therefore, reflect in its wording that the principle of
separation of powers has been respected.
Yet, the U.S. intelligible principle doctrine cannot be fully
understood without examining some other cases in which the
Supreme Court was asked to examine the constitutionality of agency
regulations. In these cases the Court sought to find whether Congress
provided an unambiguous delegation to federal agencies.
In Chevron v. NRD C,210 the Supreme Court held:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of a statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.
If not, the second question for the Court is whether the agency's
interpretation of its delegated powers is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. In Chevron, the Supreme Court ruled
that EPA's decision to allow States to treat all pollution-emitting
devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were
encased within a single "bubble" is a permissible construction of the
statute "which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air
208. ENDICOTr, supra note 1, at 38.
209. Milano, supra note 41, at 641.
210. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
211. Id. at 842-43.
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pollution with economic growth." '212 On the first prong, the Court
held that Congress did not precisely determine the meaning of the
"stationary source" that the Agency had to regulate.213 Thus, under
Chevron's second step, the Court deferred to the agency's
determination under the statute.
Therefore, an ambiguous statute is not necessarily
unconstitutional, and federal agencies' regulations remain valid if
based on permissible constructions of the statute. Yet, ambiguity is
another interesting aspect of poorly drafted statutes. Ambiguity is
somewhat different from vagueness. A vague word "has one meaning
(and its application is unclear in some cases)" whereas an ambiguous
word "has more than one meaning (and it may be unclear, in some
cases, which is in use)." '214  The Supreme Court provides this
distinction even if ambiguous statutes, as we have seen above, are
valid for constitutional purposes. The Constitutional Council does
not seem to make this distinction in its cases as it uses "ambiguous" as
synonymous with "imprecise. 21 5 And yet, imprecision is a vagueness
problem. Timothy Endicott explains that "imprecision is the
typifying feature of words that are vague in the broad sense. 216
Therefore, the Council has failed to distinguish "ambiguity "from
'unintelligibility.' ' 217 It uses these two notions together, within the
principle of intelligibility and accessibility of law.218
D. The Foreseeable Nature of the Law
The Constitutional Council has not exactly defined the
foreseeable nature of the law as a component of the quality of law
doctrine, but some commentators have read this additional prong into
the Constitutional Council's cases. 19
The foreseeable nature of the law is an argument used by the
European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"). According to
European judges:
212. Id. at 866.
213. Id. at 860-62.
214. ENDICOTt, supra note 1, at 30.
215. CC decision no. 2003-475DC, supra note 65.
216. ENDICOTr, supra note 1, at 33.
217. See CC decision no. 2003-475DC, supra note 65.
218. Id.
219. See Milano, supra note 41, at 640.
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First... the citizen must be able to have an indication that is
adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a
given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a "law"
unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the
citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able-if need be with
appropriate advice-to foresee to a degree that is reasonable in
the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may
entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with
absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable.
Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its
train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace
with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are
inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent
are vague and whose interpretation and application are
questions of practice.2
As it usually does, the ECHR sets in the same paragraph the
principle and its limits. Here, the principle of the foreseeable nature
of the law is a requirement that permits the Court, in the same way
that the U.S. Supreme Court does, to define a useful prong in order to
protect citizens' rights from vague laws.
One will not be surprised to find in ECHR cases a direct
influence from the Supreme Court's vagueness test. Even if the
Supreme Court does not use the same formulation, the purpose of the
foreseeable nature of the law and the purpose of the first prong of
vagueness test seem to be very close. The citizen for both ECHR and
Supreme Court must be able to regulate his conduct.
The Constitutional Council does not use in its cases the
foreseeable nature of the law as an argument. Nevertheless, the
"sufficient knowledge" that the law must provide to the citizens
seems also to carry with it the principle of the foreseeable nature of
the law. Thus, in 2005, in a case in which the constitutionality of the
Finance Act was challenged, the Constitutional Council wrote that
the citizen should be able to foresee to a reasonable degree
(prdvisibilit raisonnable) the amount of tax according to different
options that the statute opens to him.2
Using different wording than the Supreme Court, the ECHR and
the Constitutional Council look to communicate a similar principle.
220. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245,271 (1979-80).
221. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1970); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 108-09 (1972).
222. CC decision no. 2005-530DC, supra note 85.
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In their theoretical constructions, these three courts seek to endow
the citizen with a new argument against the infringement of his rights.
But, where the Supreme Court and the ECHR both provide a
clear vagueness doctrine, the Constitutional Council fails to do so.
Indisputably, the reason of the doctrinal void that the Constitutional
Council has left is due to the abstract nature of its judicial review.
Perhaps if the Council could hear concrete cases, it would have
greater opportunity to develop its quality of law doctrines, perhaps
even borrowing vagueness principles from the Supreme Court.
The several types of vagueness we have explored in this paper
(i.e., ambiguity, complexity, accessibility, delegation) are often better
suited to concrete cases than to abstract a priori judicial review. In a
sense, vagueness is hard to determine with vague facts. As a result,
vagueness challenges brought before a challenged law is enforced
may be found to be unripe for review in Article III courts."3 Indeed,
lower courts in the United States have interpreted the Supreme Court
to suggest that "outside the domain of the first amendment,
vagueness challenges must be assessed 'as applied.' ' 224  On a like
theory, the Constitutional Council's hesitation to fully develop a
vagueness doctrine within its limited jurisdiction of a priori review is
quite understandable. However, that may be now changing.
E. Raising a New Quality of Law Doctrine Through the Procedure of
'Question Prejudicielle'
In summer 2008, the French Constitution was amended in order
to grant to citizens the right of referral to the Constitutional Council.
Among the other amendments of the Constitution that the
Government achieved to pass that summer, the new process of
"question prdjudicielle" ("preliminary question") is indisputably the
most important.22 An institutional act has to be adopted before we
223. See, e.g., Zanders v. Swanson, 573 F.3d 591, 593 (8th Cir. 2009); Nova Health Sys.
v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2005).
224. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 864-65 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds,
530 U.S. 1271 (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988); Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)). See also NRA of Am. v.
Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 291 (6th Cir. 1997).
225. New article 61-1 reads:
If, during proceedings in progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a
legislative provision infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution, the matter may be referred by the Conseil d'Etat or by the Cour de
Cassation to the Constitutional Council which shall rule within a determined
period... An institutional Act shall determine the conditions for the application
of the present article.
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really know how this new procedure will be applied, but we can
already presume that the quality of law doctrine more and more
closely resembles the vagueness doctrine.26
The "preliminary question" is a procedure that permits a citizen,
whose rights are infringed, to challenge the constitutionality of a
statute before the court. 7 The ordinary judge in front of whom the
constitutional issue is raised has to surseoir d statuer (stay the
proceedings), draw up the preliminary question, and send it to the
Constitutional Council.2 ' The latter will control the constitutionality
of this statute and provide an answer to this question in order to
permit the ordinary judge to resolve the case.229  This procedure is
roughly analogous to the procedure of "certified question" in the
United States23° and certification by national courts in the European
Court of Justice.231
The preliminary question introduces an element of concrete
judicial review in the French system by granting the right of referral
to the appellate and administrative courts. This new procedure will
enable the Constitutional Council, if future plaintiffs challenge the
constitutionality of a statute on the grounds of the quality of law
doctrine, to assess the vagueness of a statute in a concrete case. This
new procedure may very well oblige the Constitutional Council to fill
the doctrinal void it has left in the past.
Conclusion
The lack of a concrete judicial review in France leaves the
Constitutional Council far behind the U.S. Supreme Court. The
quality of law doctrine compared to the vagueness doctrine seems to
be itself vague and ambiguous. The abstract review does not permit
the French Constitutional Council to deal with "cases and
2008 CONST. art. 61-1 (Fr.).
226. Some Articles of the French Constitution are not self-executing. Thus,
Institutional Acts have to be adopted. This is the case for Article 61-1 of the Constitution.
227. Hugues Portelli, Rapport, fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles,
de legislation, du suffrage universel, du R6glement de l'administration g6n~rale sur le
projet de loi organique, adopt6 par l'Assemblde Nationale, relatif l'application de
l'article 61-1 de la Constitution, no. 637, Sep. 29, 2009.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Certification to federal court is a method of taking case from U.S. Courts of
Appeals to Supreme Court in which former court may certify any question of law in any
civil or criminal case as to which instructions are requested. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006).
231. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, J.O (C 340) 234.
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controversies," and therefore to measure vagueness challenges in a
concrete case.232 The U.S. Supreme Court since 1875 has developed a
tangible and logic-based scrutiny for its vagueness doctrine.
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court's vagueness doctrine may help
Congress with statutory drafting. That is not the case in France. The
lack of a clear explanation for such decisions made by the French
Constitutional Council has led to confusion in the legal world, both
among practitioners and academics.
Therefore, the new procedure of "preliminary question" seems
to be the right occasion for the Constitutional Council to build a
stronger reasoning for the quality of law doctrine. The U.S. Supreme
Court's vagueness doctrine may provide much-needed guidance to
the Council.
232. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 864-65 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other
grounds, 530 U.S. 1271; Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
494-95 (1982)).
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